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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
A jury convicted Gerson Cohen of mail fraud for paying 
kickbacks to a grocery store's purchasing agents. Cohen 
challenges his conviction, claiming that the evidence was 
insufficient; that the Court improperly admitted evidence 
that his co-conspirators had pleaded guilty; and that the 
Court wrongfully denied judicial immunity to a defense 
witness. We will affirm his conviction. The Government 
appeals Cohen's sentence, claiming that the District Court 
erred in calculating the enhancement by using the dollar 
value of the bribes rather than the benefit conferred by the 
bribe, and by granting a reduction for accepting 
responsibility. We will vacate Cohen's sentence and remand 
for resentencing. 
 
I. 
 
Butler Foods, a wholesale meat distribution company, 
sells meat to supermarket chains, individual grocery stores, 
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and restaurants. Butler Foods' salesmen made illegal cash 
payments to customers' meat managers to induce them to 
purchase from Butler Foods. The payments usually 
amounted to one penny per pound of meat purchased, 
provided that the customer bought at least 10,000 pounds 
a week. After customers made qualifying purchases, Larry 
Lipoff, part owner of Butler Foods, gave the kickback 
money to his salesmen, who then delivered the cash to the 
meat managers. 
 
Gerson Cohen, a meat salesman for Butler Foods, 
participated in this illegal payment scheme. From 1992 
through 1995, Cohen paid kickbacks totaling $111,548.21 
to five meat managers for Thriftway Food Stores. In 
addition to Cohen's regular salary by corporate check, 
Butler Foods paid Cohen $500 per week in cash. He failed 
to report this income on his tax returns for three years, 
resulting in a tax deficiency of $23,939. He was charged 
with twenty-five counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1341, and three counts of subscribing a false tax 
return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7206. The District Court 
severed the charges and convened a jury trial on mail 
fraud. 
 
The jury convicted Cohen on all twenty-five counts of 
mail fraud. He then pleaded guilty to the three counts of 
income tax fraud. Applying U.S.S.G. S 2B4.1 to Cohen's 
participation in the kickback scheme, the District Court 
initially assigned a base offense level of 8, then enhanced it 
6 levels by using the actual dollar amount of the kickbacks. 
It granted Cohen a decrease of 2 levels under U.S.S.G. 
S 3B1.2(b) for his minor role in the offense. The Court then 
considered Cohen's tax offenses and assigned a combined 
offense level of 14 under U.S.S.G. S 3D1.4. Finally, the 
Court granted Cohen a reduction of 2 levels for accepting 
responsibility under U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1. The District Court 
sentenced Cohen to twenty-eight concurrent terms offive 
months in prison, five months home confinement, three 
years supervised release, a $7500 fine, and a $1400 special 
assessment. 
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II. 
 
A. 
 
Cohen first argues that the Government's evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he used the U.S. mail. We 
disagree. An essential element of mail fraud is "the use of 
the United States mails in furtherance of the fraudulent 
scheme." United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 892 (3d 
Cir. 1994). This element requires some competent evidence 
that, as a routine business practice or office custom, the 
type of document at issue in the case was sent through the 
U.S. mail. See id. at 893-94. As we indicated in Hannigan, 
"the prosecution need not affirmatively disprove every 
conceivable alternative theory as to how the specific 
correspondence was delivered," but "some reference to the 
correspondence in question is required." Id. at 892-93. 
 
Cohen himself need not have placed the particular 
documents into the U.S. mail. A mailing is knowingly 
caused within the terms of the statute "[w]here one does an 
act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in 
the ordinary course of business." Pereira v. United States, 
347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S. Ct. 358, 363 (1954).1 Here, the 
bookkeeper for Butler Foods, who supervised the clerical 
workers who were responsible for generating and mailing 
invoices, testified extensively about the company's standard 
business practice for billing its customers. She testified 
that after the meat invoices were prepared, they were 
placed in envelopes, run through the postal meter, and put 
in a U.S. mail bin which Lipoff took to the post office in his 
car. She testified that Butler Foods never used any delivery 
method other than the U.S. mail for any of its invoices, and 
that the Thriftway invoices at issue in this case were 
handled in the normal manner. 
 
A manager at the company testified that it was standard 
practice to pick up the invoices in the U.S. mail bin and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In a factually similar case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that a meat buyer for a supermarket chain was subject to the statute 
even though he did not personally participate in the relevant mailings. 
See United States v. Lea, 618 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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drop them off at the post office, and that he himself did this 
on occasion. Finally, an accountant for the Thriftway stores 
testified that it was normal business practice for his 
company to receive Butler Foods' invoices through the U.S. 
mail. This testimony provides sufficient evidence that Butler 
routinely delivered its invoices through the U.S. mails. 
 
B. 
 
Next, Cohen argues that the District Court erred by 
admitting evidence that the three Thriftway meat managers 
whom the Government called as witnesses had pleaded 
guilty to receiving kickbacks from Cohen. Cohen contends 
that this evidence was inadmissible under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 because the risk that the jury would convict 
him based on his co-conspirators' guilty pleas substantially 
outweighed their probative value. We review the admission 
of such evidence only for abuse of discretion. See United 
States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Although the plea agreements of co-conspirators are not 
admissible to prove the defendant's guilt, they are 
admissible for some purposes: to rebut the inference that 
the defendant was unfairly singled out for prosecution, to 
dampen attacks on credibility, to foreclose an inference that 
the prosecution is hiding evidence, to explain the witness's 
firsthand knowledge of the defendant's misdeeds, and to 
elicit facts bearing on the witness's credibility. In Gaev, we 
held that the general principle applicable to the admission 
of such testimony is this: "If a co-conspirator who appears 
as a witness has pleaded guilty, the trier of fact should 
know about the plea agreement in order properly to 
evaluate the witness's testimony, unless that would unduly 
prejudice the defendant." Id. 
 
Cohen argues that admitting the guilty pleas of the three 
Thriftway meat managers was an abuse of discretion 
because he promised not to attack their credibility on that 
basis. However, "[w]hile plea agreements have often been 
admitted in response to actual or anticipated attacks on a 
witness's credibility, an attack is not always necessary to 
justify their introduction." Id. at 477-78. Even absent any 
suggestion by Cohen, it would have been natural for the 
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jury to wonder why Cohen was prosecuted but the meat 
managers were not. Moreover, the guilty pleas were 
admissible to impeach the credibility of the managers, 
whose testimony supported Cohen's claim that paying 
kickbacks was a common practice in the wholesale meat 
industry, and therefore, not criminal. That these same 
managers had entered guilty pleas for accepting the 
payments contradicted this testimony. The District Court 
concluded that admitting the guilty pleas was proper for 
one or all of the reasons cited in Gaev and would not be 
unduly prejudicial to defendant Cohen. 
 
In any case, a proper limiting instruction will normally 
cure a potentially prejudicial admission of plea agreements. 
The District Court instructed the jury not to draw 
conclusions or inferences about Cohen's guilt from the fact 
that prosecution witnesses had pleaded guilty to similar 
charges. Because the Government proffered the evidence for 
valid purposes, and the District Court gave a sufficient 
limiting instruction, admitting the guilty pleas was well 
within the Court's discretion. 
 
C. 
 
Cohen also claims that the District Court erred by 
refusing to confer judicial immunity on a witness crucial to 
his defense. According to Cohen's proffer, Larry Lipoff, part 
owner of Butler Foods, would have testified that Harold 
Friedland, owner of several Thriftway stores, admitted 
knowing of Cohen's kickbacks to two Thriftway meat 
managers. That knowledge, the defense contends, would 
have prevented Cohen from being found guilty under the 
fraud statute. When Cohen attempted to call him as a 
defense witness, Lipoff invoked his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. The Government 
refused to immunize Lipoff, who was under investigation for 
his role in the kickback scheme, and the District Court 
refused Cohen's request to confer judicial immunity on 
Lipoff. 
 
A judge may confer immunity on a defense witness who 
otherwise refuses to testify if five conditions are met: the 
immunity is properly sought in the district court, the 
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witness is available to testify, the proffered testimony is 
clearly exculpatory, the proffered testimony is essential to 
the defense, and there is no strong governmental interest 
against the immunity. See Government of V.I. v. Smith, 615 
F.2d 964, 972-73 (3d Cir. 1980). A potential prosecution of 
the prospective witness is a sufficient governmental interest 
to countervail a grant of judicial immunity. See United 
States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 965 (3d Cir. 1981). Here, 
the Government suspected that Lipoff, as the owner of 
Butler Foods and Cohen's employer, was the architect of 
the kickback scheme. Lipoff was under investigation at the 
time of Cohen's trial and has since been indicted for his 
role. Therefore, because the Government had a strong 
interest in not immunizing Lipoff, the District Court 
correctly denied judicial immunity. 
 
D. 
 
Finally, Cohen argues that the Government is 
impermissibly using his post-conviction immunized 
testimony. After Cohen's conviction, the Government 
granted him use immunity and compelled him to testify 
before a grand jury. Shortly thereafter, the Government 
appealed Cohen's sentence, and the same prosecutor who 
questioned him before the grand jury filed the 
Government's appellate brief. Based on this fact, Cohen 
claims that the Government is exploiting his immunized 
testimony in this appeal. 
 
It is true, of course, that the Government may not use a 
witness's compelled immunized testimony as evidence 
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. See 18 
U.S.C. S 6002. Thus, Cohen's immunized testimony may 
have tainted a subsequent trial, were we ordering one. 
Moreover, the decision of the U.S. Attorney here could 
potentially have infected this appeal if Cohen could point to 
some information given in the immunized testimony that 
the Government is using against him. Cohen, however, has 
not alleged any specific manner in which the Government 
used the information learned during his immunized 
testimony to gain an unfair advantage in this appeal. The 
Government supported all factual assertions in its brief 
with citations to the District Court record and made no 
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reference to Cohen's immunized testimony. Cohen, 
therefore, has not shown any prejudice to him from this 
dual role of the prosecutor. 
 
III. 
 
The Government appeals Cohen's sentence, arguing that 
the District Court misapplied two sections of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines. We review the District 
Court's factual findings for clear error. Questions regarding 
the District Court's interpretations of the sentencing 
guidelines are "purely legal," and thus require plenary 
review. United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 655 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
A. 
 
First, the Government argues that the District Court 
misinterpreted U.S.S.G. S 2B4.1 by enhancing Cohen's 
sentence with reference to the actual dollar amount of the 
kickbacks rather than to the net value Butler Foods gained 
as a result of those kickbacks. Section 2B4.1(a) assigns an 
initial base offense level of 8 to conduct involving 
commercial bribery and kickbacks. Subsection (b)(1) then 
provides an enhancement based on the greater of two dollar 
amounts: "the value of the bribe or the improper benefit to 
be conferred." The commentary to this section states that if 
the latter figure cannot be estimated, then the court must 
use the former. See U.S.S.G. S 2B4.1 application note 6. 
 
At sentencing, the parties disagreed over the correct 
interpretation of "improper benefit." The Government 
argued that the phrase referred to the net value Butler 
Foods gained as a result of Cohen's payment of the 
kickbacks. Cohen argued that it referred to the money he 
himself pocketed as a result of his kickbacks. In a colloquy 
with Cohen's attorney, the District Court appeared to agree 
that "improper benefit" meant the money accruing to Cohen 
as an individual. The Court then found it "extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure the benefit to the 
briber in this case." Therefore, it instead used the actual 
dollar amount of the kickbacks, $111,548.21, to enhance 
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Cohen's base offense by 6 levels. See U.S.S.G. 
SS 2B4.1(b)(1), 2F1.1(b)(1)(G). 
 
The District Court misinterpreted "improper benefit." 
"Improper benefit" is "the value of the action to be taken or 
effected in return for the bribe." U.S.S.G. S 2B4.1 
application note 2. The commentary to section 2B4.1 cross- 
references section 2C1.1, the comments to which state: 
 
       The value of "the benefit received or to be received" 
       means the net value of such benefit. Examples: . .. A 
       $150,000 contract on which $20,000 profit was made 
       was awarded in return for a bribe; the value of the 
       benefit received is $20,000. Do not deduct the value of 
       the bribe itself in computing the value of the benefit 
       received or to be received. In the above examples, 
       therefore, the value of the benefit received would be the 
       same regardless of the value of the bribe. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2C1.1 application note 2 (emphasis added). In 
addition, the comments to section 2B4.1 state: 
 
       As with non-commercial bribery, this guideline 
       considers not only the amount of the bribe but also the 
       value of the action received in return. Thus, for 
       example, if a bank officer agreed to the offer of a 
       $25,000 bribe to approve a $250,000 loan under terms 
       for which the applicant would not otherwise qualify, 
       the court, in increasing the offense level, would use the 
       greater of the $25,000 bribe, and the savings in 
       interest over the life of the loan compared with 
       alternative loan terms. If a gambler paid a player 
       $5,000 to shave points in a nationally televised 
       basketball game, the value of the action to the gambler 
       would be the amount that he and his confederates won 
       or stood to gain. If that amount could not be estimated, 
       the amount of the bribe would be used to determine 
       the appropriate increase in offense level. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2B4.1 application note 6 (emphasis added). 
 
Thus, "improper benefit" refers to the net value accruing 
to the entity on whose behalf the individual paid the bribe. 
Other courts agree. See, e.g., United States v. Landers, 68 
F.3d 882, 884 (5th Cir. 1995) (sales representative who 
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paid bribes is subject to enhancement based on the net 
value his employer derived from contracts obtained as a 
result of the bribes); United States v. Ziglin, 964 F.2d 756, 
758 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant subject to enhancement for 
the total amount of improper benefit that resulted from 
bribery scheme, not merely for his individual share); United 
States v. Kant, 946 F.2d 267, 269 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(defendant's sentence must be enhanced based on net 
value of improper benefit accruing to him and his two co- 
conspirators). 
 
Cohen's attorney conceded at oral argument that this 
understanding of "improper benefit" is correct. She 
acknowledged that the net value of the contracts gained by 
Butler Foods as a result of the Thriftway kickback scheme 
would be the appropriate basis for calculating Cohen's 
sentence, if the Government's evidence accurately reflected 
the net value of these contracts. 
 
At sentencing, the Government adduced evidence of the 
"improper benefit" that accrued to Butler Foods. Cohen's 
kickbacks induced Thriftway to purchase $10,000,000 
worth of meat from Butler Foods, whose seven percent 
margin yielded a profit of $700,000. On remand, the 
District Court must specifically address the evidence 
produced by the Government and any contrary evidence 
put forth by Cohen and state its reasons for accepting or 
rejecting the evidence. A $700,000 "improper benefit," if 
sufficiently proved, mandates an enhancement of 10 levels 
to Cohen's base offense. See U.S.S.G. SS 2B4.1(b)(1), 
2F1.1(b)(1)(K). 
 
Cohen offers two other arguments to support the District 
Court's enhancement calculation. First, he claims that 
section 2B4.1(b)(1) permits enhancement based on 
"improper benefit" only if that benefit would not have been 
realized "but for" the kickback. We do not interpret section 
2B4.1 to be so rigid. The text requires the court to estimate 
the value of the "improper benefit to be conferred." "To be 
conferred" is tentative language that requires something 
less than actual causation; it could include any benefit that 
the briber expected to receive at the time he paid the bribe, 
even if he did not ultimately receive it. If Cohen's reading 
were correct, the language would read "improper benefit 
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actually conferred" rather than "to be conferred." Moreover, 
even if Cohen's claim that most distributors paid kickbacks 
to customers is accurate, his "but for" argument fails. If 
paying kickbacks to potential customers was as 
commonplace as Cohen claims, then it follows that the 
contracts secured by Butler Foods as a result of its 
acquiescence in this illegal practice would not have been 
conferred if Cohen had not made these payments. 
 
Second, Cohen argues that the Government should be 
estopped from claiming that the actual dollar amount of the 
bribe was the correct measure under section 2B4.1. In 
prosecuting the three Thriftway meat managers for their 
roles in accepting Cohen's bribes, the Government entered 
into plea agreements stating that "the value of the improper 
benefit to Butler Foods to be conferred by the 
bribery/kickback payments is not readily provable as of the 
date of this agreement." In these earlier plea agreements, 
the Government simply acknowledged that, at that time, it 
did not have enough information to calculate the improper 
benefit to Butler Foods. By the time of Cohen's conviction, 
the Government had learned the relevant facts--the total 
value of meat Thriftway purchased and Butler's profit 
margin--that permitted the proper determination. Hence, 
Cohen's estoppel theory fails entirely. 
 
We conclude that the District Court misinterpreted 
section 2B4.1 and, as a result, may have applied an 
incorrect enhancement to Cohen's base offense level. 2 We 
will therefore vacate and remand for resentencing. Of 
course, it remains for the District Court to find whether the 
Government has proven its claims of resulting value by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. 
McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Judge Scirica notes that where the improper benefit conferred on a 
principal is grossly disproportionate to the bribe paid and to the amount 
received by the agent, and the disproportion is "present to an exceptional 
degree," a downward departure under S 5K2.0 might be appropriate. 
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996). 
 
                                11 
  
B. 
 
The Government also argues that the District Court erred 
by granting Cohen a 2-level reduction under section 3E1.1. 
The District Court must reduce the base offense by 2 levels 
"[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of 
responsibility for his offense." U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1. The 
determination of the sentencing judge as to whether such 
acceptance of responsibility has been shown "is entitled to 
great deference on review." U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1 application 
note 5. 
 
At sentencing, Cohen stated to the Court: "If I would have 
known when this started that it was going to be like this, 
your Honor, I would have lost the job and I would have 
gladly lost it. I'm sorry." The District Court found that 
Cohen "has accepted responsibility for his offenses, borne 
out by his statements here in court," and granted Cohen 
the reduction. 
 
The Government argues that Cohen should not have been 
granted this reduction because he went to trial on the mail 
fraud counts. This argument is supported by an application 
note to section 3E1.1 which states: "This adjustment is not 
intended to apply to a defendant who puts the Government 
to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential 
factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits 
guilt and expresses remorse." U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1 application 
note 2. While the note admits to some rare exceptions (for 
example, a defendant may go to trial to "assert and 
preserve issues" unrelated to factual guilt), none of those 
appear to be applicable to Cohen. See id. In addition, "in 
each [rare exception], . . . a determination that a defendant 
has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon 
pre-trial statements and conduct." Id. 
 
Cohen argues that the effect of application note 2 is to 
create an unconstitutional burden on defendants in 
Cohen's position by effectively penalizing them for asserting 
their constitutional right to trial. Our holding in Frierson, 
945 F.2d at 650, offers some support for this position. In 
Frierson, we held that the denial of a reduction under 
section 3E1.1 is a penalty which cannot properly be 
imposed solely for the defendant's assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. See id. at 658-59. 
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The characterization of 3E1.1 reductions has been the 
subject of some dispute. Even within circuits, the approach 
has occasionally been erratic. Compare United States v. 
Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 105 (2d Cir. 1990) ("We, like the 
Eleventh Circuit, `are unprepared to equate the possibility 
of leniency with impermissible punishment.' "), with United 
States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 626 (2d Cir. 1990) ("So 
long as the defendant's statements are not immunized 
against use in subsequent criminal prosecutions, the effect 
of requiring a defendant to accept responsibility for crimes 
other than those to which he has pled guilty or of which he 
has been found guilty is to penalize him."). A majority of the 
other courts construe denied 3E1.1 reductions as"denied 
benefits" rather than "penalties." See, e.g., United States v. 
Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076, 1086 (4th Cir. 1992) ("we fail to see 
how withholding the leniency offered in U.S.S.G.S 3E1.1 
from those who refuse to waive their right to remain silent 
can be thought punitive"); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 
822, 826 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The fact that a more lenient 
sentence is imposed upon a contrite defendant does not 
establish a corollary that those who elect to stand trial are 
penalized."); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011 
(11th Cir. 1989) ("Section 3E1.1 may add to the dilemmas 
facing criminal defendants, but . . . [w]e are unprepared to 
equate the possibility of leniency with impermissible 
punishment."). These decisions often rely on Corbitt v. New 
Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 99 S. Ct. 492 (1978). 
 
We believe that Corbitt controls our decision. In Corbitt, 
the Supreme Court held that a New Jersey murder statute 
that provided the potential for a shorter sentence to 
defendants who pleaded non vult was constitutional and did 
not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial. 
See Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 218, 99 S. Ct. at 497. In doing so, 
the Court noted that "not every burden on the exercise of 
a constitutional right, and not every pressure or 
encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid. 
Specifically, there is no per se rule against encouraging 
guilty pleas." Id. at 218-19, 99 S. Ct. at 497. To the extent 
that Corbitt is in tension with our decision in Frierson, we 
must follow the Supreme Court. Sentencing Guideline 
3E1.1 creates an analogous incentive for defendants to 
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plead guilty, and under Corbitt, this incentive is 
constitutional. 
 
Were this simply a matter of determining a defendant's 
credibility, we would defer entirely to the District Court 
because we cannot claim to have an equal ability to 
perceive and judge the defendant's demeanor. That is to 
say, the words "I am sorry," uttered by a defiant defendant, 
mean nothing. The same words from a contrite defendant 
mean everything. Here, however, because the sentencing 
guidelines need to be consistently interpreted to serve their 
purpose, and because the comments to the various sections 
provide an avenue to consistent interpretation, we must see 
that they are applied by a sentencing court. We will vacate 
and remand for further consideration. 
 
We recognize that this case presents the unusual 
situation in which the defendant has pleaded guilty to some 
of the charges against him (the tax counts) while going to 
trial on others. The sentencing guidelines do not specifically 
address this situation, noting only that "truthfully 
admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of 
conviction" is a factor for the judge to consider. U.S.S.G. 
S 3E1.1 application note 1(a). In cases such as this, the 
trial judge "has the obligation to assess the totality of the 
situation in determining whether the defendant accepted 
responsibility." McDowell, 888 F.2d at 293 n.2. Were the 
District Court able to grant a credit for Cohen's guilty plea 
to the three tax charges separately, then we would see no 
error. However, the guidelines do not allow for this because 
multiple counts of conviction must be grouped before an 
adjustment can be made for acceptance of responsibility 
under Part E of Chapter 3 of the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.1. As a result, the "totality" assessment must include 
the fact that Cohen originally pleaded not guilty to all the 
counts and put the Government to its proof on the majority 
of the charges, pleading guilty to the tax counts only after 
being convicted on the bribery charges. 
 
IV. 
 
Because we conclude that the District Court 
misinterpreted sections 2B4.1 and 3E1.1 of the sentencing 
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guidelines, and that it must make findings of fact with 
respect to whether the Government has proved the benefit 
to be conferred upon Butler Foods, we will vacate Cohen's 
sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with 
this opinion. We reject all other allegations of error. 
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